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Complicity as Legal Responsibility
Honni van Rijswijk
Abstract, Complicity is emerging as a key cultural and critical term for
understanding settler responsibility in postcolonial contexts – especially in
thinking through the sense of responsibility arrived at through transitional jus-
tice processes. But what sense can we make of complicity within more
pedestrian legal processes? Here, I examine an emergent narrative of com-
plicity in “everyday law” through the framework of evaluating harms provided
by the Royal Commission into Institutional Reponses to Child Sexual Abuse
(“the Commission”). I analyze one case study in particular – the 19th public
hearing of the Commission was held between October 22 and 31, 2014, and
on November 14, 2014 (“the Bethcar Case Study”) – to provide a reading of
complicity in the context of everyday legal proceedings that took place within
the wider context of Australia’s postcolonial reckoning of harms suffered by
the Stolen Generations. This article focuses on the role and conduct of law-
yers, and of law, in the civil proceedings relating to institutional responsibility
for abuse, a process at a seeming distance from the scene of original trauma.
I argue that the Commission makes available a narrative of the lawyers’ role
in the ongoing violence against survivors – one story and case study that, as
it concerns abuse in the context of the removal of Aboriginal children, is part
of wider structural violence against Aboriginal people. The Commission pro-
vides a rich source for analyzing these legal processes and provides an
archive of lawyers’ responsibility that is not normally made available through
law. It examines the complicity of the legal profession in harms produced by
the legal system itself.
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This article considers the framework of evaluating harms provided by the Royal
Commission into Institutional Reponses to Child Sexual Abuse (“the Commission”)
through the conceptual lens of complicity. I analyze one case study in particular –
the 19th public hearing of the Royal Commission was held between October 22 and
31, 2014, and on November 14, 2014 (“the Bethcar Case Study”)1 – to provide a read-
ing of complicity in the context of everyday legal proceedings that took place within
the wider context of Australia’s postcolonial reckoning of harms suffered by the Sto-
len Generations. This means the case is significant not only as a narrative of quotid-
ian legal violence, but also in how this quotidian violence relates to national
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narratives concerning the Stolen Generations. A number of legal and quasi-legal
processes have been central to the framing and understanding of the harms suf-
fered by the Stolen Generations. These processes include the Bringing Them Home
(1997) report,2 “The Sorry Books,”3 a handful of cases at common law, and Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd’s “Apology to Australia’s Indigenous People” in 2008.4 I argue
that the Commission generates an alternative archive of the violence committed
against the Stolen Generations – one that emphasizes the wider violence and com-
plicity of Australian publics and institutions, including legal institutions. Further,
the Commission’s ambit includes the public dissemination of new forms of responsi-
bility, and offers the possibility that its case studies can become allegories of new
forms of memory and responsibility in Australia. The Bethcar Case Study provides
a thick description of the ways in which Australian lawyers may become complicit
or “implicated [legal] subjects,” to adopt and transform Michael Rothberg’s term,5
through routine case management.
Complicity is emerging as a key cultural and critical term for understanding set-
tler responsibility in postcolonial contexts. Complicity potentially emphasizes tem-
poral and spatial proximities to colonial violence by reworking traditional analysis
of responsibility to highlight continuing structures and networks. In his work on
the connection between South African intellectuals and apartheid, Mark Sanders
argues that complicity means “actively affirming a complicity, or a potential com-
plicity, in the ‘outrageous deeds’ of others.”6 Complicity also captures responsibility
for failing to act – it points to culpability that goes beyond guilt for direct actions, to
include omissions, thoughtlessness and failures to take notice. These failures are
more elusive to capture under law’s account of responsibility, which is better at
redressing positive acts that case damage in contrast to harmful omissions.7 Com-
plicity also connects individual responsibility to the responsibility of a collective.
Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (1994) posits complicity as a feature of
modernity, and as a concept that incorporates a framework that is wider than the
law’s: “complicity is not determined by a relation to law but is a moral criterion of
judgment.”8
But what sense can we make of complicity within more pedestrian legal proc-
esses? Here, I examine an emergent narrative of complicity in “everyday law” – not
in the context of transitional justice or extraordinary justice, but regarding a rela-
tively routine civil case. This article focuses on the role and conduct of lawyers, and
of law, in the civil proceedings relating to institutional responsibility for abuse, a
process at a seeming distance from the scene of original trauma. I argue that the
Commission makes available a narrative of the lawyers’ role in the ongoing violence
against survivors – one story and case study that, as it concerns abuse in the context
of the removal of Aboriginal children, is part of wider structural violence against
Aboriginal people. The Commission provides a rich source for analyzing these legal
processes and provides an archive of lawyers’ responsibility that is not normally
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made available through law. It examines the complicity of the legal profession (and
law) in harms produced by the legal system itself.
The harms at the centre of the Bethcar Case Study concern sexual abuse suf-
fered by a number of former residents of the Bethcar Children’s Home in New South
Wales (NSW) (“Bethcar”). Bethcar was a home for Aboriginal children, which was
run first in Brewarrina and later in Orange by Mr. Burt and Mrs. Edith Gordon. In
February 1969, the Gordons moved to the “Old Mission” in Brewarrina and
obtained a five-year lease of the old Brewarrina Mission from the Minister for
Aboriginal Affairs. The home operated until 1989. Some of the children were admit-
ted to the control of the state and placed at Bethcar; some were committed by the
court to the care of the Gordons; and some were placed voluntarily by their fami-
lies.9 The Commission examined a number of aspects of relevant institutions’ poor
responses to this abuse, including the state’s failure to monitor the residents, and
the inadequate response of the NSW police force to complaints made by the resi-
dents about the abuse. A particular focus of the Bethcar Case Study was the civil
proceedings brought by 15 former residents of Bethcar in 2008, and the poor han-
dling of these proceedings by the Department of Youth and Community Services
(now known as the Department of Family and Community Services – “the
Department”), and its legal practitioners, including the NSW Crown Solicitors
Office (CSO) and barristers retained by those solicitors.10 It is this aspect of the
Bethcar Case Study that I will take as my focus and, in particular, the archive of
complicity that it reveals – the ways in which a legal institution caused suffering to
vulnerable claimants who were the survivors of child sexual abuse and also mem-
bers of the Stolen Generations. The violence of these kinds of everyday civil proceed-
ings is usually hidden, especially as there are few venues in which the wider
postcolonial context could be narrated.
Royal Commissions, as non-court based tribunals, are unique – commissions are
not bound by the usual rules of evidence of courts, and may adopt an inquisitorial
approach. In Australia, Commonwealth Royal Commissions are established by the
Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth),11 which provides sui generis powers of investi-
gation that are in many ways more extensive than the powers of a court.12 A Royal
Commission is not subject to the Commonwealth’s legislation relating to evidence
but operates in parallel, with its own regime of evidence rules.13 Institutionalized
child sexual abuse has been the subject of investigations, reports and commissions
in a number of jurisdictions.14 Significantly, the terms of reference for these com-
missions and inquiries go beyond the common law’s focus on victim and perpetrator
to consider the responsibility of established and powerful institutions, including
governments and their agencies, the police, the legal profession and the church.15
Letters patent establishing the current Commission and its terms of reference were
released on January 11, 2013,16 authorizing and requiring the Commission to
inquire into “institutional responses to allegations and incidents of child sexual
abuse and related matters.”17 The terms of reference ask the commissioners to
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consider matters of historical abuse as well as to make recommendations regarding
policies and practices for the future conduct of institutions in relation to the protec-
tion of children. Public hearings began in September 2013 and are ongoing, with a
number of case studies being conducted across the nation.
STRUCTURES OF COMPLICITY
The Commission into Child Abuse has solicited thousands of hours of public and pri-
vate survivor testimony, which has been important for the recognition of survivors’
experiences and to the production of evidence. However, as an archive, the Commis-
sion has also produced an enormous archive of responsibility, in addition to the
archive of suffering – through testimony given by lawyers, priests, teachers, institu-
tional leaders etc., who are called on to give an account of their actions.
Case Study 19: Bethcar Children’s Home
The harms at the centre of the Bethcar Case Study took place in the context of the
harms suffered by the survivors as members of the Stolen Generations. Almost 20
years have passed since Bringing Them Home initiated a reparative process in
response to the harms suffered by the Stolen Generations. The report made strong
political and legal claims,18 and it did important work in documenting “the every-
dayness and bureaucratization of genocide and of massive human rights violations
in the liberal democratic state,”19 making a significant intervention into the silence
of both the legal domain and the public sphere of that time. But despite the recom-
mendations of Bringing Them Home, no federal reparations scheme has been imple-
mented. The effect of this failure is particularly stark, considering there has been
only one successful action in law,20 so there is little availability for survivors to
obtain not only compensation but also statements of responsibility and culpability
on the part of institutions and individual actors.
Compounding the effects of the absence of clear legal and political responsibility
is the strength of the public, affective narrative that subordinates questions of state
and public responsibility for harms to the Stolen Generations, to discourses of rec-
onciliation and empathy. In Australian public life, the lexicon of responsibility has
been limited to concepts of reconciliation21 and positions of regret, empathy or apol-
ogy.22 In both Bringing Them Home23 and the Apology,24 a public, affective
response has been shaped through the dominance of the survivor testimony as a
key form in which Stolen Generations’ harms are explained and communicated.
This testimonial approach structures these harms as “scenes of suffering” rather
than as “scenes of injustice.”25 In Raymond Williams’ terms, this sentimental narra-
tive is dominant, and “has effectively seized […] the ruling definition of the social.”26
Further, responsibility in Bringing Them Home was broadly textured, outlining
the national and international legal frameworks that applied to the removals, but
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not focusing in detail on the actions or responsibilities of specific institutions and
individuals. No criminal proceedings arose out of the findings. The wide range of
people who were responsible for the policies of child removal, and who were involved
in child removals – still-living public servants, legislators, politicians, police offi-
cers, heads of institutions and government ministers – were not included in the pro-
cess of acquiring the testimonies that formed a large part of the inquiry, or of the
subsequent report. Raimond Gaita argues that those authorities and their agents
would be guilty of genocide and should have faced trials: “How can one say that
genocide had been committed, yet only ask for an apology and compensation? How
can you think genocide always to be a serious crime, yet find it unthinkable to call
for criminal proceedings?” Gaita also states that, in Australia, such trials “are liter-
ally unthinkable, and that they are so […] is the most persuasive evidence that the
significance of the crimes against the Aborigines has not been fully appreciated.”27
A number of the Commission’s case studies cover institutions that were also the
focus of Bringing Them Home (including Case Study No. 7: Parramatta Training
School for Girls and the Institution for Girls in Hay; Case Study 17: Retta Dixon
Home; and Case Study 19: Bethcar).28 The focus of this paper is on the Bethcar Case
Study, which elucidates the violence within legal processes experienced by survivors
of child sexual abuse who tried to redress their claims. Although the original harms
of sexual abuse, which resulted in criminal convictions, took place in the 1960s and
1970s, the civil legal proceedings were recent – taking place between 2008 and 2013.
LEGAL COMPLICITY
How do we explore the implicated position of lawyers working within the frame-
work of state law? Placing the lawyer at the center of inquiry, productively opens
up questions regarding lawful conduct, ethical conduct, micro-aggressions, and fail-
ures to act and respond – to reframe moments in which lawyers use the legal pro-
cess in ways that adhere to the letter of the law, but perhaps not to its spirit of
justice. The unique form of the Commission brings out, in specific, material ways,
the networks and structures operating within and between legal institutions. The
Commission has strong powers to call people to give evidence, and has significant
flexibility in how that evidence is given. Its focus is neither on perpetrators nor vic-
tims’ experiences (although these both form part of the terms of reference), but
rather on the responsibility of institutions, including state institutions. This focus
on institutional responsibility has meant that narratives of responsibility are
formed using a wider lexicon of figures beyond victim and perpetrator.
Legal practitioners in NSW, as in other Australian jurisdictions, are required to
conduct themselves with reference to specific obligations to their clients, as well as
to the court.29 As a state agency, the CSO also has obligations arising out of the
model litigant policy. This policy requires state agencies engaged in civil litigation
to behave not only lawfully but also “ethically, fairly and honestly to model best
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practice.”30 More specific obligations of agencies under the policy include dealing
with claims promptly, not taking advantage of clients who lack resources, avoiding
litigation where appropriate, keeping legal costs to a minimum, and apologizing
when the state has acted inappropriately.31 Senior counsel assisting the Commis-
sion argued that the Department and the CSO breached the model litigant policy
on a number of grounds, including by using an approach to the litigation that drew
the process out as much as possible, and which included tactics designed to humili-
ate the plaintiffs, such as requesting their criminal histories (histories that were
irrelevant to the claims), and by planning surveillance of the victims that was
unnecessary and would only embarrass them.32
In May 2008, two former residents of Bethcar brought proceedings against the
Department based on allegations of sexual abuse by Mr. Gordon, Mr. Gibson and
another resident. They claimed that the Department was vicariously liable for their
abuse, and also liable in negligence for failing to act despite knowledge of the
abuse.33 A solicitor employed by the CSO, Evangelos Manollaras, was allocated the
proceedings under the supervision of a senior solicitor, Helen Allison. Manollaras
was the lowest-grade solicitor employed by the CSO and had “never before acted in
a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse.”34 In July 2008, the principal
solicitor of the Women’s Legal Service of NSW (WLS), Janet Loughman, filed a
statement of claim on behalf of 13 plaintiffs (including Kathleen Biles, Jodie Moore,
Amelia Moore, Leonie Knight, and plaintiffs given the pseudonyms AII, AIE, AIG,
AIO, AIH, AIN, AIQ, QID and AIF), which was also allocated to Manollaras.
The matter came before Knox DCJ in May 2009. His Honor described the
Department’s approach to the litigation at that point as taking “every root and
branch objection” to the plaintiff’s claim, which, he indicated, was out of line with
the NSW model litigant policy for civil litigation.35 By the time the final mediation
occurred on December 17, 2013, and all proceedings were resolved, the
Department’s expenditure on the litigation was approximately A$3.7 million. The
bulk of these costs comprised legal costs of around A$2.2 million36 and only about
one-third of this total went to the claimants as damages. At the mediation, each of
the former residents who was still a party to the proceedings agreed to settle their
claims for approximately A$107,000 in damages and an apology.
Extraordinary revelations about the conduct and attitudes of the legal practi-
tioners were made during the Commission’s proceedings. The correspondence of
Manollaras, the solicitor in charge of the matter at the CSO, revealed problems in
his understanding of sexual violence, as well as his attitude about the victims’ moti-
vation in bringing an action (and that of their legal practitioners). In November
2009, Manollaras wrote to the retained junior counsel for the CSO, Patrick Saidi,
regarding a request from the WLS for mediation. Manollaras wrote that, in his
opinion, the WLS understood mediation as “a situation where the defendant turns
up with a cheque book and after some polite conversation […] and several cups of
coffee […] the plaintiffs walk off with damages.”37 On July 6, 2010, Manollaras
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wrote to Saidi commenting on allegations that Leonie Knight had made that Mr.
Gordon had “comforted her by hugging her, kissing her and fondling her breasts.”38
Manollaras made the following observation:
I am wondering whether a report by Leonie Knight either may have
been an exaggeration or, if not an exaggeration, whether Eggins
and Robinson [Department officers] had formed the wrong conclu-
sion, by making a quantum leap between the child being comforted
by Gordon on the one hand, all the way up to sexual interference by
Gordon of Leonie Knight.
For example, a distressed child could be comforted in a normal man-
ner by a hug and a kiss. Granted I am having a problem with fon-
dling of breasts, but I still think it is a quantum leap, even if there
was some fondling of breasts, to conclude sexual interference.39
In August 2010, Manollaras spoke with Saidi and Paul Arblaster (another bar-
rister retained by the CSO to assist Saidi), and recorded a file note of the meeting
that stated that “counsel advised that the ‘best bet’ for the defendant was to ‘knock
off’ as many plaintiffs as possible on the limitation question.”40 In other words, in
2010, the view of the liability question was that the Department would likely fail,
and so counsel was suggesting that the Department should push technical ques-
tions – such as the question of the limitation period and the time bar defense – in
order to draw out the process as much as possible. This strategy went against the
model litigant policy, which would suggest that the CSO should have been encour-
aging the Department to settle this case because the liability question was likely to
be decided against it. The model litigant policy explicitly outlines that the CSO
should not rely on limitation defenses.
There was also evidence that the CSO actively hid information about important
witnesses from the victims. Manollaras contacted an investigator, Peter Maxwell,
in mid-2008 to perform some investigatory work for a matter involving Bethcar.41
Maxwell was later asked to prepare an affidavit in relation to the searches he had
conducted regarding witnesses who he was either unable to locate, who were
deceased, or who may not have been in a position to provide evidence in court.42
However, Maxwell omitted references to other, relevant witnesses in his affidavits,
those who would have been able to give evidence, and who obviously would have
been very important to the survivors’ case, despite “everyone in the team [… know-
ing] that there were other witnesses.”43 Maxwell knew of at least 70 relevant people
who were not mentioned in his two affidavits.44
The Commission elicited statements of guilt and acknowledgments of responsi-
bility from the legal practitioners and from the Department. It also elicited a
detailed account of the affective states of those complicit actors – asking questions
that would compel the witnesses to articulate their understanding of the impact of
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their actions on the survivors. Counsel Assisting the Commission asked Michael
Coutts-Trotter, Secretary of the Department at the time of the hearing, to reflect on
the point that the survivors who had earlier (and successfully) given evidence for
the state that had led to the criminal conviction and incarceration of Mr. Gibson
were yet asked by the state to prove their allegations in the civil forum:
Question. […] Sitting there today, it’s a matter
which those women who had the courage to make complaints to
the police and give evidence, resulting in convictions,
would find particularly difficult to understand in
circumstances where, in one forum, the State had been
upholding their evidence in order to indict and incarcerate
Mr. Gibson, but, in another forum, the State was making them
prove the very things that had been upheld in that other
forum?
Answer. It would have been baffling.45
Coutts-Trotter also admitted that he felt “ashamed” that the Department
requested particulars from the plaintiffs their criminal histories.46
Allison, the senior solicitor supervising Manollaras at the time of the proceed-
ings, was subjected to significant examination, given that Manollaras was the low-
est-grade solicitor employed by the CSO and had “never before acted in a case
involving allegations of child sexual abuse.”47 The Commission asked Allison a
number of questions, seeking to obtain admissions from her concerning her under-
standing of the victims’ painful experiences of litigation, and her own culpability in
this. In effect, the Commission was asking Allison to articulate an expansive con-
cept of responsibility, beyond her technical responsibilities as a solicitor, to include
moral considerations, as well as consideration of the significance of her behavior in
the wider context of harms suffered by the Stolen Generations. The Commission
also wanted Allison to articulate her understanding of the model litigant policy as a
directive that had “deep” rather than “surface” requirements. At each turn, Allison
rejected the Commission’s attempts, insisting on a narrower reading of her role.
Allison was asked about the Department requiring the plaintiffs to prove allega-
tions that the state had already tried and convicted:
Q. Can I ask this question, Ms. Allison? If it were the
position that it was known within the Crown Solicitor’s
Office at the time the defences were filed that there had
been convictions of Mr. Gibson in respect of the sexual
abuse that was the subject of the allegations in the
litigation, assume that was known at the time the defences
were put on, can you comment on this proposition: there
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is, it might appear, a rank hypocrisy where the State has
indicted and convicted a person in respect of allegations
of sexual abuse for the State to later, in civil
proceedings, put the plaintiffs to proof in respect of
those same matters; would you comment on that?48
Allison responded that “if it was known, it should have been admitted,” though
she refused to agree with counsel assisting the Commission that the proposition
was “hypocritical.”49 Allison disagreed that litigation involving allegations of child
sexual abuse differed from other litigation.50 When asked about the fragility of vic-
tims of child sexual abuse, it became clear that she had not read the medical reports
of the case:
Q. Can I ask you to comment on some general propositions
about allegations or litigation involving allegations of
child sexual abuse. Do you agree that litigation, where
there are allegations of child sexual abuse, differs in a
number of important respects with other what might be
called more garden-variety personal injury type litigation?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. You don’t agree with that?
A. No.
Q. One of the things about litigation brought by victims
of child sexual abuse is often they are very damaged and
fragile people; would you agree with that?
A. Yes – well, to be honest, I’m not an expert and I
don’t know. I mean, I accept that’s probably the case,
but –
Q. You would have seen plenty of reports from
psychiatrists over the years in cases where plaintiffs
allege child sexual abuse, talking about the effect of that
abuse on their psychiatric condition, wouldn’t you?
A. No, I haven’t.
Q. You did in this case, didn’t you?
A. I haven’t read the medical reports. I have had
summaries of them.
Q. So you’re not able to comment whether, as a general
proposition, one aspect of litigation involving people who
have suffered child sexual abuse is that they will often
present in the sort of fragile state that we saw some of
the Bethcar ladies present yesterday?
A. They may, and so may other plaintiffs.51
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She suggested that the Department’s “thinking back in 2008 […] and even a
number of years ago” did not contemplate the issues of proof and credibility in rela-
tion to historic child sexual abuse.52
When asked whether the crown, as a model litigant, should do what it can to
avoid delays in litigation, and when the chair summarized the CSO’s approach as of
one of prevarication and delay, Allison insisted that the “Crown is entitled to main-
tain its position in an adversarial system”:
Q: You see, looking at this file – and you’re familiar with it now –
there appears to be possibly a reflection of a culture which affects
many of our adversarial processes. People write letters, people bring
motions, Judges are required to resolve matters that could be, or
should be, sorted out between practitioners. Do you understand
what I am saying?
A: Yes, I understand what you’re saying Your Honour.
Q: Do you think it’s incumbent upon the Crown, as a model litigant,
to do what it can to avoid those sorts of matters, those sorts of issues
troubling litigation?
A: No, I don’t Your Honour. I think the Crown is entitled to main-
tain its position in an adversarial system.53
Allison insisted on reading the questions in a technical way, upholding the letter
of the law and trying to limit her answers to technical questions – and at each point,
resisting invitations to reflect on the affective or moral consequences of her actions.
She refused the Commission’s suggestion that, in the case of vulnerable plaintiffs
pursuing a claim relating to sexual abuse, the CSO should take a broader approach
that takes account of issues of the context of this vulnerability. Nevertheless, coun-
sel assisting the Commission continued to ask her questions that went beyond ques-
tions of technical legal compliance, broadening the concept of “responsibility” that
applied to her role as a legal practitioner in these circumstances:
Q. And do you think it would have been useful, then, for
you to know in 2008, 2009 and 2010 that it is very common
for children who are sexually abused not to make
a complaint until many, many years later?
A. Again, that’s why they’re referred to psychiatrists
for a professional opinion.
Q. And you don’t consider that that should be something
that you should know of, as a solicitor, when you’re making
a decision to plead the Limitation Act in defence of
a claim?
A. That’s correct.
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…Q. Ms. Allison, do you accept, then, that on the
plaintiffs’ view of the evidence, in circumstances where
the State’s breaches of duty led to these children being
abused, children who were born into poverty and continued
to live lives of poverty and were impecunious when they
brought their action, in circumstances where children who
are sexually and physically abused suffer injury not only
at the time of the abuse but also lifelong consequences,
those subject to a model litigant policy should not just
consider whether the Limitation Act is an available defence
but whether it is also proper and fair for the very
department, very State department, that may have caused
those injuries, to plead it as a bar to their actions?
A. I think it’s available and can be pleaded. The
department – if the department, on a policy basis, doesn’t
want us to plead the limitation defence, then we will not
plead the limitation defence.54
Counsel assisting the Commission drew Allison’s attention to a document
requesting particulars signed by Manollaras. The document asked the plaintiffs
whether they had committed any criminal acts. The chair put it to Allison that the
questions contained in the document “could only be there to embarrass” the plain-
tiffs, and that the answers were already within her client’s knowledge.55 Allison
agreed that while the question should never have been in the letter, it was still
“incumbent on the plaintiffs” to provide particulars.56
When asked whether it was proper and fair for the state department that may
have caused the lifelong injuries to the plaintiffs to plead the passage of time as a
bar to their actions (through a defense based on the Limitation Act), Allison said, “I
think it’s available and can be pleaded.”57 Commissioner Fitzgerald asked Allison
whether she actively considered her actions were fair and proper in her conduct of
the case, to which she responded that she did, by “applying the law to the facts,” and
when preparing for mediation, putting in “a great deal of effort” to settle in a way
that “would help the plaintiffs get some closure.”58 In Allison’s final statement she
acknowledged that she saw herself as playing a part, as a lawyer, but that in her
capacity as a non-lawyer, she would draw upon other, wider standards of evaluation.
Upon being excused, Allison stated that she had “been in the witness box defending
the actions of the State […] as a lawyer,” but appreciated that “what happened at
Bethcar was horrible,” and that she tried “to handle that as sensitively as possible to
give […] some sort of closure to these plaintiffs.”59 This kind of distinction – the dis-
tinction made between what a person thinks or does “personally” compared with
what one does in one’s role as a lawyer, teacher or priest, is a theme brought out
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across the Commission’s proceedings, and is a distinction that seems important in
producing complicit behaviors. When finally asked whether she would behave differ-
ently with hindsight in cases such as Bethcar, she said, “Yes, I think so.”60
As public listeners and readers of this transcript, the focus on institutional
action – and on the actions of individuals working within institutional structures –
directs not only our attention but also our affect. The treatment of participants in
the Commission proceedings invites us to identify with the witness who is explain-
ing their irresponsibility. We perhaps cringe for Allison, and feel shame. We imag-
ine ourselves in her same position. This imaginative act creates a bond between us,
as readers, and Allison. While the testimonial culture of Bringing Them Home and
the Apology places us as readers and listeners at a distance from suffering, looking
on in pity at the suffering of others but not provoked to act, the Commission pro-
ceedings place us in the uncomfortable position of being complicit in that suffering,
and as responsible in ways that are both marked and unmarked.
The tactics carried out by the legal practitioners that counsel assisting the Com-
mission characterizes as being problematic – including requesting particulars that
were already known to the Department, requiring plaintiffs to plead their state-
ments of claim separately, requiring the plaintiffs to prove the allegations of sexual
abuse despite liability being established previously in criminal proceedings, pro-
longing the point at which they agreed to mediation, and even the use of surveil-
lance and demand for the claimants’ criminal histories61 – are not uncommon
practices in the context of litigation, and would be viewed by many legal practi-
tioners as legitimate ways to further their client’s interests. What is usually not
(publicly) apparent is the impact of these tactics on claimants, particularly vulnera-
ble claimants, and the part that these tactics play in the wider context of harms to
survivors of sexual abuse and child removal. These legal processes are usually not
subject to public scrutiny; solicitors who breach their obligations may be subject to
disciplinary professional proceedings and/or judicial proceedings, but the range of
such an investigation would not be as wide as that under the Commission. The
inquisitorial and public forum of the Commission allowed it to ask questions that
went beyond legal technicality, and to frame judgment of the lawyers’ behavior
using wider concepts of morality and fairness. The Commission case studies are
open to the public, and they are also relayed live over the internet; daily transcripts
of proceedings are made available freely online. Where other judicial processes are
public, non-interested parties are generally not entitled to access transcripts and
even if they are allowed, the cost of obtaining these transcripts is prohibitive. The
Commission provides a public domain of evaluation not only to judge the individual
actions of the solicitors and of the CSO, but also to consider more broadly the vio-
lence of our legal system – to demonstrate the complicity of the civil litigation sys-
tem in protecting the state from the perpetuating structural inequalities and by
furthering the suffering of claimants who are already vulnerable. The Bethcar Case
Study draws together the collective role of lawyers in the civil litigation, and the
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impact of their actions on increasing the suffering of victims of child abuse. The
Commission called witnesses and documents to investigate the six long years of liti-
gation that the survivors endured before a settlement was achieved in 2008. In the
words of the Chair of the Royal Commission, “this is about the quality and integrity
of the course taken by the State in defending a common law claim.”62
The Commission has used the inquisitorial form to obtain a nuanced account of
the responsibility of actors – not only the responsibility of perpetrators of sexual
abuse, but also the responsibility of more complexly implicated subjects including the
bystanders and facilitators of abuse: institutional colleagues and even leaders who
knew about the abuse and did nothing. The Commission’s focus and processes have
produced a thick description of the operation of extra-legal power – the ways in which
legal responsibilities to report crimes, for example, were ignored in favor of local cul-
tures and alliances, intended to preserve the reputation of a church or a school. As in
the testimonial archives of Bringing Them Home, the case studies focus on the
thoughts, feelings and judgment of those who present evidence – but in addition to
therapeutic and empathic modes, the Commission also explicitly elicited from wit-
nesses statements about their moral and legal culpability, demanding acknowledge-
ments of their wrongdoing, guilt and shame. At different points the Commission
sought the responsible party to demonstrate that they understand and acknowledge
their culpability, as well as seeking acknowledgments that they would do things dif-
ferently given the chance, and would change their approach and policies into the
future. The institutional responses to child abuse examined by the Commission have
ranged from incompetence and mismanagement of complaints to a range of behaviors
that could lead to liability under criminal and civil law, including non-disclosure and
deliberate cover-ups. Witnesses to the Commission provided testimonial statements,
and then were subject to interrogation by counsel assisting the Commission, as well
as by counsel of other interested parties, including survivors. These interrogations
covered the range of the Commission’s terms of reference, investigating past events,
the consequences for current and future policy, and also the moral aspect of failures.
The Commission’s concept of responsibility went beyond the roles of perpetrator and
victim to involve a more complex and subtle lexicon of figures, including the
bystander, accomplice, culpable witness, and irresponsible caretaker, negligent or ill-
intentioned institutional head, the corrupt priest or school principal who held the
interests of the church or the school ahead of the interests of a child/survivor, and,
the focus of this article, the legal practitioner who was merely “doing their job,” but
who failed to take into account the impact of their actions on survivors, and failed to
evaluate their own actions according not only to their professional and legal obliga-
tions but also according to a wider ethical framework.
The Bethcar Case Study examined the actions, file notes, correspondence, and
state of mind of the Department, and its solicitors and barristers. It considered
together both civil and criminal proceedings, when these would otherwise be evaluated
separately. The legal practitioners’ file notes and actions became evidence of conduct,
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but did not comprise the complete picture of conduct: the Commission treated past
notes and actions as a prompt, demanding practitioners to provide a narrative – as an
occasion for expansion, rather than as a point that spoke for itself. The Commission
demanded responses within frameworks of morality, considerations of “fairness,” and
affect, requiring legal practitioners to go beyond a technical reading of the law.
The above examination of an element of the Bethcar Case Study is only one part
of a very complex case, and there are many cases comprising the Royal
Commission’s proceedings. However, the above descriptions provide an indication
of the network of complicities that the Royal Commission is revealing through its
investigations. The focus on institutions – including institutions that might seem
removed, such as the CSO, which became involved some years after the initial
events of sexual abuse – demonstrates the implication of individuals and organiza-
tions across time. In contrast to law’s linear conceptualization of responsibility, the
Bethcar Case Study offers a model of responsibility that can be thought of meta-
phorically as acting laterally, through networks and entanglements.
There are some qualifications to the Royal Commission’s framework, how-
ever – for example, some abuse lies outside its scope, since the Royal Commission
focuses on institutional abuse, not abuse inflicted in foster homes, and it also
focuses on sexual abuse rather than on the range of harms. The context of
removal of Aboriginal children is also largely missing from the Commission’s
framing of these case studies. The Commission is still in process, and final
reports are some time away – the duration of the inquiry was extended by two
years in November 2014, and the Commission now has until December 15, 2017
to report on the inquiry and make recommendations based on its findings. One of
the dangers of the Royal Commission is that, like the earlier and significant
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, any recommendations,
even if they are excellent, will not necessarily be implemented through legislative
and policy changes.
FROM CASE STUDY TO LEGAL NARRATIVE
Complicity more effectively represents the nature of responsibility in a settler state,
in contrast to reconciliation. Reconciliation works within a teleological concept of
responsibility, where violence is seen to be confined to discrete events, which can be
resolved and put behind us. The archive of complicity that is being publicly pro-
duced through the Commission’s proceedings, is, I think, one step in the direction of
establishing a deeper sense of responsibility in the Australian imaginary of respon-
sibility, generating narratives that explicitly address the role of lawyers in legal vio-
lence, remembering that
if genocide takes place, it takes place as law and not simply dis-
guised as law – law understood as a system of meaning and a social
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practice. […] From within its logic, it will not look like genocide at
all: it will look just like any other law.63
This practice is part of what Desmond Manderson names “the apocryphal,” which
“attempts to reclaim those aspects of law hidden by law’s power to name and
unnamed.”64 In postcolonial contexts such as Australia, settler lawyers are impli-
cated legal subjects in ways that are just beginning to be explored and marked.
This article has examined just one small element of the network of complicity
that is being mapped through the Commission’s investigations – a process that is,
in this sense, more significant at this stage than the Commission’s findings, and the
legal and political consequences that may (or may not) ensue from these findings.
These proceedings provide an analogy for the ongoing sense of responsibility, across
time and spatial boundaries, that is meaningful in the settler context – networks,
spirals and connecting loops of responsibility threaded across our institutions and
implicating government, legal and private practices at every stage. This is a much
better metaphor of culpability compared with the linear model of reconciliation,
which would make a clean break with the past, and would try falsely to suggest
that settler institutions are untouched in the present (and into the future).
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